Thurman Arnold\u27s International Antitrust Legacy by Page, William H.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
7-1-2003
Thurman Arnold's International Antitrust Legacy
William H. Page
University of Florida, page@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
William H. Page, Thurman Arnold's International Antitrust Legacy, Antitrust Source, July 2003, at 1 (reviewing Wyatt Wells, Antitrust
and the Formation of the Postwar World (2002)), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/163
theantitrustsource  w w w . a n t i t r u s t s o u r c e . c o m  J u l y  2 0 0 3 1
I
Book Review:
Thurman Arnold’s International Antitrust Legacy 
Wyatt Wells
Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World
Columbia University Press ▪ 2002 
Reviewed by Wil l iam H. Page
In the decades before the World War II, a new economic philosophy favoring cooperation among
competitors challenged the competitive model embodied in the antitrust laws. In the United
States, the cooperative model had some successes in, for example, the Webb Pomerene Act of
1918, the associational activities of the 1920s, and the NRA codes of the 1930s. And, of course,
antitrust law itself, after some false starts,1 came to recognize that some forms of cooperation are
necessary for efficient production. Outside the United States, however, especially in the economic
turbulence following World War I, policymakers adopted such an extreme form of the cooperative
model that they not only tolerated but actively assisted the formation and operation of international
cartels as means of organizing production. Wyatt Wells’s fascinating study shows that America’s
efforts to project its antitrust policies internationally during and after World War II played a critical
role in the destruction of this “cartel ideal,” particularly in Western Europe. This ideological trans-
formation had lasting effects for the development of the world economy.
Among the book’s many points of interest for antitrust practitioners are its accounts of the 
formation and operation of cartels. Wells shows that during the prewar period international cartels
formed in steel, light bulbs, and rubber, each for different reasons: the steel industry was char-
acterized by high concentration and a homogeneous product; the light bulb industry required
extensive sharing of intellectual property; and the rubber industry, although fragmented, enjoyed
the supervision of multilateral treaty. By 1939, according to one study, “cartels were active in indus-
tries that accounted for 42% of world trade,” (p. 25) albeit with varying degrees of success.
In the United States, many of the early New Deal reforms, particularly the NRA, reflected ele-
ments of the cooperative ideal. But in his second administration, Roosevelt turned to aggressive
antitrust enforcement as central feature of his economic recovery policy, appointing Thurman
Arnold to head the Antitrust Division.2 Wells reminds us repeatedly of just how radical Arnold’s
enforcement program was. He quotes, for example, an internal 1942 Division memo that proposed
a restructuring of business everywhere in the world (p. 211):
Selling must largely be divorced from manufacture; manufacturing firms must become more narrowly 
specialized; needless industrial combination, whether vertical or horizontal, must be avoided; and the
maximum permitted size in corporate units must approximate the minimum size requisite for efficient, 
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1 See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States, 115 F. 610, 620–21 (6th Cir. 1902).
2 See generally ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE (1966). 
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specialized production. Information about products (advertising) should be provided mainly by disinter-
ested agencies, governmental and private. 
The least controversial aspect of the Division’s policy program was its opposition to cartels, but
even here Arnold took that hostility to new levels, publicly linking Hitler’s rise to cartels, and warn-
ing darkly of similar threats to democracy in the United States. 
Again, Wells reveals the operation of major cartels, this time focusing on links between
American firms and the German chemical manufacturer IG Farben. He also offers chronicles the
conflicts within the Roosevelt Administration over the role of antitrust in the war mobilization effort.
The Division repeatedly insisted that vigorous antitrust enforcement was necessary to sever
American firms’ involvement with international cartels. Some of the claims were questionable at
best. In an important revelation, Wells debunks Arnold’s charge—repeated by respected histori-
ans to this day—that Standard Oil’s deals with IG Farben delayed the development of synthetic
rubber essential for the American war effort. Arnold’s claims in this and similar cases succeeded
in creating a climate of hostility to international cartels. But his vehement insistence on antitrust
prosecutions of firms engaged in war production led the Attorney General to cede to the
Secretaries of the Army and Navy the power to delay prosecution of antitrust cases that they
believed hindered mobilization-a power they wielded freely.3 Arnold also made enemies by repeat-
edly challenging the actions of the War Production Board on competition grounds. Finally,
Roosevelt rid himself of Arnold by appointing the combative Assistant Attorney General to the 
D.C. Circuit. 
Nevertheless, the administration’s actions against cartels continued in a variety of contexts,
such as farm and regulatory programs, and especially in planning for postwar international trade
policies. And the Antitrust Division, despite its setbacks in 1943, resumed its challenges to inter-
national agreements, some of which it mischaracterized as cartels. Wells describes a number of
Division prosecutions in the immediate postwar period that led to important Supreme Court deci-
sions like National Lead, Line Material, and Timken Roller Bearing. 
The most dramatic application of the Antitrust Division’s radical policies, however, was in the
postwar decartelization and deconcentration programs in occupied Germany and Japan. In both
countries, representatives of the Division and their ideological allies sought to impose a restruc-
turing of industry far more extreme than anything conceivable in the United States. Proponents of
these policies argued that the German cartels and Japanese Zaibatsu played central roles in the
emergence of warlike totalitarian regimes in their respective countries, and that the occupiers must
reshape the countries’ economies if they hoped to institute democratic reforms. In Germany, the
decartelization policy was largely successful, but the more ambitious and dubious deconcentra-
tion program fell far short of its most zealous advocates’ dreams, although there was a significant
restructuring of I.G. Farben. Wells concludes that the occupation policies ultimately succeeded in
instilling an antitrust sensibility in Germany, because antitrust ideas accorded well with the process
of liberalization in the western zones of occupied Germany and throughout Europe. 
The anti-Zaibatsu program, however, was essentially a failure, despite the exclusive American
control of postwar Japan’s economy and political system. There, as in Germany, an American com-
mission prescribed an extreme program of dissolution of large firms, but the collapse of the
Japanese economy and the rise of the Soviet threat prevented any substantial implementation.












3 See Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile, Antitrust in Wartime, ANTITRUST, Spring 2002, at 71. 
American policy shifted instead toward promoting recovery. After the occupation, Japanese
authorities reversed the few moderate antitrust reforms that Americans had effected. The Japanese
Fair Trade Commission, Wells observes, allowed the Zaibatsu to reemerge as Keiretsu and
allowed cartels to spread throughout the economy in order to foster “rationalization.” Wells attrib-
utes the failure of antitrust in Japan to the hostility of government officials and the virtual absence
of foreign trade until well into the 1950s. 
In a final chapter, Wells describes the post-war operation of international cartels in oil and steel,
and the antitrust policies adopted in response to them. He describes the Antitrust Division’s
attempt to prosecute the major oil producers, only to be thwarted by orders from Presidents
Truman and Eisenhower. Wells defends presidential interference in these instances on the ground
that cartels played a legitimate role in an industry located in highly unstable and undeveloped
regions of the world. He contrasts this failure of antitrust enforcement with the largely successful
efforts of the European Coal and Steel Community to break up cartels in their industries. 
All of these accounts support Wells’s primary argument that antitrust has succeeded in the
United States because of our political stability and economic prosperity, and that the United States
has exported antitrust successfully only where the policy has been accompanied by political and
economic liberalization. Antitrust has failed in countries with unstable autocracies and illiberal
trade policies. While Thurman Arnold’s promotion, at all costs, of his populist brand of antitrust was
a necessary spur to American efforts to promote competition worldwide, the ultimate success of
American policy in other countries turned out to be dependent on pragmatic officials who imple-
mented it in a broader program of political reform and relaxation of trade barriers. 
Although Wells’s main story ends in the 1950s, he extends individual parts of his argument into
the 1980s. He could have taken the narrative further. It would be interesting to explore the extent
to which Arnold’s antitrust vision has influenced the development of European competition law.
Wells’s account would also provide an interesting historical context for the Antitrust Division’s more
recent prosecutions of international cartels and for the emergence of antitrust enforcement pro-
grams in today’s transition economies. 
Although Wells is a historian and not a lawyer or an economist, Antitrust and the Formation of
the Postwar World adds significantly to our understanding of the workings of international cartels
and the political context of antitrust enforcement. Antitrust practitioners, policy makers, and aca-
demics should welcome it.
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